In pursuing their mandate of providing good and safe drinking water, water system operators and asset owners work continuously towards developing and maintaining the trust and confidence of their customers. The goal of developing and maintaining customer trust has led to an increased emphasis in the water sector to explicitly assess and manage risks. In this paper, we introduce Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) as an approach to assessing technical and organizational risk in the water industry. LOPA offers a robust, rational and defensible approach for assessing the adequacy of independent protection layers (IPLs), such as treatment units, standard operating procedures and incident response procedures, used to mitigate environmental and process risks in water supply systems. The strength of LOPA is not only its ability to facilitate a review of technical systems' reliability, but also its versatility to be used for the review of organizational resilience under trying conditions and the opportunity to learn from failure. This is demonstrated in this paper with a review of more than 400 incidents affecting a large water utility serving some six million customers between 1997 and 2006.
INTRODUCTION
In pursuing their mandate of providing good and safe drinking water, water system operators and asset owners work continuously towards developing and maintaining the trust and confidence of their customers. The goal of developing and maintaining customer trust has led to an increased emphasis in the water sector to explicitly assess and manage risks, particularly against a background of highly publicized water quality incidents in recent years. The provision of safe and reliable services requires a management approach that identifies and prioritizes all risks and supports decision-makers in taking the correct course of action. This
In this paper, we introduce Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) as an approach to assessing technical and organizational risk in the water industry. The methodology and fundamental concepts behind LOPA offer a robust, rational and defensible method for assessing the adequacy of the mechanisms for mitigating environmental and process risks in water supply systems known as independent protection layers (IPLs). Building on process hazards analysis techniques, LOPA applies semi-quantitative measures in the evaluation of the frequency of potential incidents and the probability of corresponding failure in the IPLs. The LOPA methodology can therefore be used to identify safeguards that meet the IPL criteria of specificity, independence, dependability, and auditability, and to identify areas of concern or weaknesses. Treatment units, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and incident response procedures are all examples of IPLs.
BACKGROUND
Risk analysis and assessment techniques, developed in the water sector as a response to high profile contamination events, are widely used to aid the identification and management of hazards and their respective risks. These techniques were defined as a formal and systematic critical examination of the processes and engineering intentions of new facilities, meant to assess hazard potential of mal-operation or malfunction of individual items of equipment and the consequential effects. There are three emphases in asset risk management: to ensure that the proposed asset delivers the desired outcome in terms of its functionality; to optimize time, cost, quality, and residual risk within the project process; and to credibly and defensibly select and assure risk mitigation measures throughout asset operation.
Managing risk in the face of finite resources has long been an implicit component of asset management in the water sector. On-going demand for financial self-sufficiency and controlled pricing has created a climate where water utilities have to rigorously evaluate spending on operations and maintenance budgets, as well as capital investments, without compromising public health or their facilities' impact on the environment. Screening out all risk to public health is unachievable, but conversely, permitting excessive levels of risk is not acceptable (Pollard et al. ) . Thus, risk management is becoming an increasingly recognized approach to assess and prioritize levels of safety, investment and maintenance requirements.
In organizations with risk management systems, the systems are based on business processes that primarily result in some form of an asset management decision (British Standards Institution ). One of the key requirements of effective asset investment and maintenance decisionmaking is ensuring that data and processes are in alignment with strategic objectives. This decision-making process may include (Bradshaw ):
• setting assets' operational objectives;
• deriving acceptability thresholds for risk and reliability that adequately define 'system safety,' including public health risks and occupational health and safety;
• developing dedicated risk registers to identify and define risk;
• assessing risks to prioritize capital, operations and maintenance investments;
• investigating and evaluating risk mitigation measures in terms of cost, benefit and residual risk;
• specifying safety criteria based on risk assessments; • specifying engineering design criteria, e.g. technical reliability, materials;
• specifying data flow, monitoring and control design criteria for human-machine and machine-machine interfaces;
• designing operational processes and procedures;
• designing incident detection and response procedures; and • defining normal and abnormal operating procedures.
In asset design, the control of public health risk and associated systems' reliability is achieved through formulating performance specifications with an understanding of the consequences and probabilities of failure (Crossland et Dunn () defines three root causes for system failures: physical failure of equipment, failure due to human interaction, and failure within the organizational decisionmaking processes. Dunn () proposes an asset integrity assessment process which is the meta process of risk management, environmental management, maintenance management, and safety management processes. The asset integrity assessment is a review against current standards and specifications that employs a risk matrix with defined probabilities and categories for consequences of failure to production, environment, and safety. The designed operating parameter envelope is reviewed against operating parameters, and the consequence of exceeding parameters is assessed. The routine maintenance program is assessed and compared to the risk profile from the design and operations review, but is also compared to individual needs for maintaining components (Dunn ) .
The introduction of a socio-technical system's perspective as described by Dunn () broadens the scope for risk assessments. A methodology is required that considers a water system risks not only from a physical asset-centric • Specificity -An IPL is capable of detecting and preventing or mitigating the consequences of specified, potentially hazardous event(s), such as a runaway reaction, loss of containment, or an explosion.
• Independence -An IPL is independent of all the other protection layers associated with the identified potentially hazardous event. Independence requires that the performance of one IPL is not affected by the failure of another IPL or by the conditions that caused that IPL to fail. Most importantly, the IPL is independent of the initiating cause.
• Dependability -The protection provided by an IPL reduces the identified risk by a known and explicit amount.
• Auditability -An IPL is designed to permit regular periodic validation of the protective function.
Qualitative risk analysis techniques can result in over-or under-protecting systems, and may run the risk of being unduly influenced by emotion or personal biases. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, can require significant resource investments.
METHODOLOGY
The research preceding this paper consisted of a retrospective review of a series of incidents (419) • a strong organizational culture of reliability;
• staff competencies via continuous learning and intensive training;
• effective and varied patterns of communication;
• adaptable decision-making dynamics and flexible organizational structures; and
• system and human redundancy (Bradshaw et al. ) . In this study, the previous incidents were further reviewed using the following protocol:
1. Record all reference documentation, including hazards analysis documentation.
2. Document the process deviation and hazard scenario.
3. Identify all initiating causes for the process deviation and determine the frequency of each initiating cause. 
Staff competency
The review of incidents revealed that staff generally mana- were effectively communicated to all relevant staff and external bodies. In 6.9% of the incidents, the incident documentation identified aspects of excellent communication that significantly contributed to the effectiveness of the incident management response. In 13.1% of the incidents, some areas of improvements were identified which meant that the incident was unnecessarily prolonged. In 6.2% of the incidents, 'poor communication' had a significant adverse impact on the overall performance of the incident management response.
Adaptable decision-making dynamics and flexible organizational structures
The incident documentation was studied to identify the ability of the organization to adapt its organizational structure to respond to the needs arising during an incident. It was found that in 88.3% of the incidents, the organization assumed an effective organizational structure to place it in the best possible position to effectively reduce the incident impact on customers and reinstate normal operations. In 9.7% of the incidents, the assumed organizational structure was deemed 'adequate considering the circumstances'. In only 2.1% of the incidents was the incident management organization rated as 'inflexible'. This suggests that the organizational structure assumed during the incident was inadequate to manage the complexity of the incident situation.
The incident assessment also focused on decisionmaking during incidents. It was found that 64.8% of the incident management efforts could be characterized as 'good decision-making'. The decision taken during the incident significantly and pro-actively contributed to reducing the impact on customers and to re-instate normal operations as soon as possible. In 24.8% of the incidents, the decision-making was 'responsive to needs' meaning that the incident management efforts pursued an effective course of action by reasonably practical means. The remainder of the incidents were, in hindsight, characteristic of poor judgment, poor decision-making, and were non-adaptive to the incident situation. These responses were identified as being ineffective to return the incident situation to normal operation, and provided an opportunity to learn lessons for enhancing the incident management response.
Overall, the organization demonstrated that decisionmaking under trying conditions effectively draws the necessary and correct conclusions from the data presented to the incident management team during an incident. This suggests that the quality of the decisions made is a reflection of the data availability during an incident, but also on the competence of the decision-makers involved during an incident.
In 10.4% of the incidents, scope for improvements in data availability and/or competence in decision-making was identified. This aspect of personnel interaction clearly warrants dedicated attention.
System and human redundancy
The entire water supply system depends on duty standby systems or excess capacity to isolate failed assets and compensate for their loss. The use of systems' redundancy was investigated as part of the incident management response. We define systems' redundancy as any means of water supply capability capable of diversion to compensate for failed assets or installations. This definition considers systems' redundancy to originate from fixed installations, but excludes bottled water and delivery via water tankers.
In 55.2% of the incidents, no systems' redundancy was available to reduce the impact or avoid customer impact.
In the majority of these incidents, the water utility resorted to the supply of bottled water. In 22.1% of the incidents, the use of systems' redundancy did not avoid customer impact although it had a reducing effect. In 15.9% of the incidents, the use of systems' redundancy significantly reduced the impact of incidents on customers and avoided the impact for a much larger customer base. Combined, this suggests that over 93% of incidents show the system redundancy successfully mitigating or reducing the impact on customers. In only 6.2% of the incidents, systems' redundancy was available and used but had a low effect on reducing the incident impact.
Designing redundancy for a system can be counterproductive, as back-up functions can increase technical complexity, conceal errors and discourage individuals from performing their specified tasks (Sagan ). Although we did not find significant evidence of this, we believe that there is a potential for maintenance decisions to be deferred due to multiple technical redundancies; that is, duty standby systems have a significantly reduced probability of failure that may lead to an assessment of low risk and low priority in maintenance spending.
Human resource management practices that support reliability
In recruitment and selection, organizations with strongly developed IPLs select suitable and skilled candidates aiming to match, as closely as possible, the complexity of the environment with appropriate skills and competencies.
An incident manager has to be able to cope with highly uncertain situations and demonstrate rational decisionmaking under trying conditions. The incident manager has to be able to communicate effectively with the staff and stakeholders involved in incidents. They also require a good understanding of the entire water supply system, whilst drawing on expert knowledge of the incident man- 
DISCUSSION
The aim of this review was to further understand how the organization responds and functions during incidents and under trying conditions. As such, the following organizational attributes were considered to be IPLs as defined in procedures for the analysis of layered protection:
• a strong organizational culture of reliability;
• staff competencies via targeted recruitment and selection, continuous learning, and intensive training;
• system and human redundancy (Bradshaw et al. ) .
All of these dimensions have been observed to contribute to the effective management of water safety and reliability of this particular organization. It was found that each dimension is important individually, but it is when acting together as a coherent configuration that incidents are effectively managed and future risks can be sufficiently understood and planned for.
We characterize and analyze each IPL in turn. With respect to IPL specificity, it was found that the organizational characteristics provide the capability to detect and prevent or mitigate the consequences of specified, potentially hazardous events. The organizational characteristics are integrated into a culture of organizational reliability.
They can operate independently of all the other IPLs associated with the identified potentially hazardous event;
therefore, the failure of one IPL does not affect other
IPLs. The protection provided by the organizational characteristics significantly reduces the identified risk by a known and explicit amount. Lastly, the IPL is designed to permit regular periodic validation of the protective function.
As illustrated in this case study, LOPA offers the ability to assess the performance and adequacy of utility IPLs.
As a result of the dependability and auditability characteristics of IPLs, the examination of historical performance should also correlate with the expected future behavior of the IPL under distress. This may permit utilities to identify weaknesses that can be proactively addressed, rather than remaining unaware of system threats that may damage the utility's reputation or result in damages, injuries, illnesses or fatalities.
While LOPA permits utilities to assess their IPLs at their facilities, and with respect to the performance of their employees, its application is more limited within the distribution system infrastructure. Due to the size and inaccessibility of distribution system assets, as well as the complexities intrinsic in the mixed materials, ages, and sizes of pipes, there are fewer practical preventative IPLs that can be implemented beyond the mitigating IPLs discussed. This represents a clear limitation of LOPA in addressing system risks.
Irrespective, the methodology and fundamental concepts behind LOPA offer a robust, rational and defensible approach for assessing the adequacy of IPLs, such as treatment units, SOPs and incident response procedures, used to mitigate environmental and process risks in water supply systems. Hence, the strength of LOPA is not only its ability to facilitate a review of technical systems' reliability, but also its versatility to be used for the review of organizational resilience under trying conditions and the opportunity to learn from failure. As a result, LOPA ultimately enhances systems' safety and reliability.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, Layer of Protection Analysis is introduced as a risk analysis and assessment instrument within water utilities. A data set of over 400 incidents that occurred in a large representative water utility between 1997 and 2006 was used to investigate organizational and technical barriers (IPLs) for their effectiveness to inhibit incident propagation.
The analysis of incidents for the utility suggests that IPL characteristics significantly contribute to reducing the public health impact of incidents. The utility has evolved its organizational and incident management structure to handle customer impacts as effectively and expediently as is practically possible. The regional water utility values clear objectives, ensures that they are well understood within the organization and by its partners, and has invested in its staff to ensure that people are performing the right roles and the right skills to work effectively.
